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This paper examines the effect of diversification on farm value by comparing values of 
diversified farms to a portfolio of comparable specialized farms.  Using data from the 
Agricultural Resource Management Study, this study finds a diversification discount in 
agriculture similar to the discount found for corporate firms.  The results show that 
diversified crop/livestock farms have a value loss of 5.8% in comparison with specialized 
crop or livestock farms for 1999-2001.  Farms with commodity diversification have a 
value loss of 9.4% in comparison with commodity specialized farms.  The results also 
show that the value loss due to diversification is larger for leveraged farms. 
 
Key words: diversification, diversification discount, farm value, leverage.   1 
The Farm Diversification Discount 
Corporate firm diversification has received a lot of attention during the last decade (for a 
survey of recent literature see Martin and Sayrak).  Numerous finance studies have 
argued that the level of corporate diversification has been trending downward and that 
diversification is related to a lower value for the firm and losses to the shareholders.  
Lang and Stulz, Berger and Ofek, and Servaes show unambiguously that diversified firms 
trade at a discount relative to specialized firms in their industries.  These results seem to 
be robust for different time periods and different countries.  Recent finance studies 
showing diversification discounts have used the Berger and Ofek models which compare 
the value of a diversified firm with the value of a portfolio of similar specialized firms. 
Several finance studies offer alternative explanations for the diversification discount 
(Shin and Stulz; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales; and Lamont).  The poor performance of 
diversified firms is usually attributed to a misallocation of internally generated funds 
because of inefficiency or agency problems.  This misallocation problem results in cross-
subsidization, where investments in the firm’s poor-performing segments are made with 
cash flows generated from well-performing segments. 
Unlike the corporate sector, the agricultural sector has become more diversified 
over the last two decades (Popp and Rudstrom).  Farm diversification is a frequently used 
risk management strategy and plays an important role in agriculture (Harwood et al.).  
However, there are only a few studies on farm diversification and none examining the 
consequent gains or losses due to diversification.  Previous studies have focused on the 
factors influencing farm diversification (Kurosaki; Mishra and El-Osta; Pope and 
Prescott), on the risk-reduction associated with diversification (Schoney, Taylor, and   2 
Hayward; Nartea and Barry), and on the effect of diversification on farm returns, farm 
income, and farm size (Purdy, Langemeier, and Featherstone; Mishra, El-Osta, and 
Johnson; Sumner and Wolf).  These studies generally find evidence that diversification 
reduces risk but the results for the effect of diversification on farm returns, farm income, 
and farm size are mixed.  Furthermore, the overall effect of diversification on farm value 
is not known.  The goal of this paper is to apply the Berger and Ofek methods to examine 
the effect of diversification on farm values and to measure diversification gains or losses 
to farmers. 
Agriculture is an interesting application for the methods applied to the corporate 
sector.  Unlike corporate firms, farms are usually small in size, capital-intensive, with 
low debt-to-asset ratios, and are not organized as corporations (Barry and Robison).   
Perhaps the most important difference from the corporate sector is that there is no market 
to trade equity shares in agriculture.  Equity investors can diversify away idiosyncratic 
firm risk by investing in a well-diversified portfolio of firms and therefore diversification 
at the firm level is not necessary to reduce risk.  Diversification at the farm level through 
different crop and/or livestock enterprises is often needed to mitigate risk for farm asset 
owners.  A potential benefit from diversification comes from combining enterprises with 
imperfectly correlated revenues.  This coinsurance effect gives diversified farms a greater 
debt capacity than specialized farms (Lewellen).  Another benefit associated with 
diversification is the complementary use of equipment and activities on the farm 
(economies of scope).  The costs associated with enterprise diversification may be the 
need for specialized equipment and broader managerial experience and forgoing   3 
economies of scale.  Farmers consider these tradeoffs when making diversification and 
specialization decisions for their farms. 
This paper examines whether the diversification discount documented for 
corporate firms is also found in agriculture.  The study applies the innovative Berger and 
Ofek methods to compare the value of a diversified farm with the value of a portfolio of 
similar specialized farms and determine the gains or losses associated with 
diversification.  The risk effects of diversification are also explored in terms of gains or 
losses in value to farms with different capital structures. 
 
The Excess Value Model 
This section outlines the Berger and Ofek excess value model which is used to determine 
whether diversification enhances or decreases farm value.
1  The excess value model 
compares asset values of diversified farms with asset values of specialized farms where 
these values are normalized or weighted by the value of farm production to correct for 
differences in farm size.  For example, suppose that a “representative” specialized crop 
farm produces $80,000 in crop value and has assets worth $800,000 and a 
“representative” specialized livestock farm produces $100,000 in livestock value and has 
assets worth $700,000.  The excess value model states that a diversified crop/livestock 
farm producing $80,000 in crop value and $100,000 in livestock value should, on 
average, have assets worth $1,500,000.  If the actual value of assets for the diversified 
farm is lower than the imputed value when compared with specialized farms then this 
                                                 
1 This approach has the advantage of being neutral to agricultural and time shocks that affect all farms in a 
similar way (Campa and Kedia).       4 
farm would have a negative “excess” value which is associated with a diversification 
discount.   
The excess value model is generalized as follows.  Consistently with finance 
studies using the Berger and Ofek model, farm value is measured by farm total assets.  
Farms are classified as specialized (or single-enterprise) farms and diversified farms.  For 
each group of single-enterprise farms specialized in an enterprise j, the median for the 
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where Vij is the farm value and wij is the value of production for farm i specialized in an 
enterprise j, N is the number of farms specialized in an enterprise j, and m denotes the 
farm with the median ratio of farm value to value of farm production.
2   
The excess value model imputes a theoretical value for the assets attributed to an 
enterprise j as the value of enterprise j production times the above calculated median 
ratio.  The imputed value for farm i is calculated as the sum of the imputed values for all 















The excess value for farm i is calculated as the natural logarithm of the actual farm value 












                                                 
2 Due to skewness of distributions and for consistency with other studies, the median ratio rather than the 
mean ratio is used in the analysis.  Using the mean ratio produces similar results.   5 
Negative excess values would indicate that diversification is associated with a lower farm 
value.
3,4  A diversification dummy variable di is defined as 1 if farm i is diversified and 0 
if it is specialized.  A regression model is estimated to find the relationship between farm 
diversification and excess values after controlling for other variables that might affect 
farm excess values: 
(4)  EVi = b0 + b1(di) + b2(farm sizei) + b3(leveragei) + b4(government paymentsi) + 
b5(farmer agei) + b6(farmer educationi) + b7(household sizei) + b8(off-farm incomei) + ei. 
The coefficient b1 on the diversification dummy variable captures the percentage 
difference in average excess values between specialized and diversified farms, i.e. the 




The excess value model requires that diversified and specialized farms are matched based 
on every enterprise i in order to impute values.  For corporate firms, firm segments are 
matched based on the same two-digit, three-digit, and four-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code.  A growing concern in the finance field is the measurement 
error associated with firms self-reporting segments that sometime combine unrelated 
activities (Martin and Sayrak).  An advantage of this study is that it is possible to clearly 
identify enterprises based on the production of a single commodity.  In this study, farm 
                                                 
3 The excess value is measured in logarithmic percentages for consistency with finance studies using the 
Berger and Ofek methods. When an alternative measure was considered, EXVAL1=[V-I(V)]/I(V), the results 
were qualitatively similar. 
4 Instead of comparing farm asset values with imputed farm asset values, one could compare return on 
equity with imputed return on equity.  An imputed return on equity for each enterprise of a diversified farm 
can be obtained after matching with specialized farms.  When summing the imputed return on equity for all 
enterprises in a diversified farm, it is not clear what the weights for each enterprise should be.  The weights 
could be the proportion of the value of production or sales of an enterprise as is the case here, however, a 
consistency of measures similar to the asset value calculations cannot be obtained. 
5 The rationale for choosing these control variables is discussed in the results section.   6 
enterprises are matched using two alternative criteria: whether farm enterprises produce 
crops or livestock and whether farm enterprises produce the same commodity.  
Consequently, two alternative diversification criteria are considered: crop/livestock 
diversification and commodity diversification.  Crop/livestock diversification occurs 
when a farm has both crop and livestock enterprises.  Commodity diversification occurs 
when a farm produces different commodities.
6  The two alternative diversification criteria 
may reflect different reasons for diversification.  For example, a corn-soybean 
diversification may spread out labor and machine use over critical times at planting or 
harvest (Harwood et. al.) whereas a corn-hog diversification may utilize corn as feed for 
the hogs. 
When estimating the excess value model with different measures available at the 
firm segment level (assets, sales, or earnings), previous finance studies found similar 
results.  For the farm data used in this study, sales (open-market sales and contract sales) 
and value of production are measured for each enterprise whereas assets and earnings are 
measured at the farm level.  The value of production includes sales as well as the value of 
production that is produced but not sold.
7  Using value of production to measure losses or 
gains in value due to diversification is appropriate when a crop is fed to the livestock and 
when commodity storage is utilized.  For example, in the case of vertical integration 
when the produced crop is used for livestock feed then using the value of crop production 
(but not crop sales) will reflect the existing crop-livestock diversification.  Therefore, the 
                                                 
6 For example, a corn-soybean farm is classified as a specialized farm using the crop/livestock 
diversification criteria and as a diversified farm using the commodity diversification criteria. 
7 The Farm Business Summary Program developed by the Economic Research Service, USDA calculates 
the value of production that is produced but not sold as the difference between the quantity produced and 
quantity sold times the state-level commodity price.   7 
value of production for each enterprise is used to measure the value of gains or losses due 
to diversification, although using enterprise sales gives similar results. 
 
Value Losses for Equity and Leveraged Farms 
Enterprise diversification is associated with lower farm risk due to the existence of 
several enterprises with imperfectly correlated returns.  Such reduction in farm risk is 
beneficial for farm lenders and leads to an increase in debtholder value.  A contingent 
claims theory suggests that equity represents a call option on the value of farm assets 
exercised when the value of farm assets is greater than the value of farm debt.  Reducing 
the riskiness of the farm also reduces the value of the call option and therefore decreases 
the equityholder (farmer) value and increases the debtholder (lender) value.  A lower 
level of debt is associated with a deeper-in-the-money option, and therefore, a lower 
impact of risk on the value of the call option.  Therefore, an all equity farm is not 
expected to have significant losses due to the reduction of risk (Mansi and Reeb).  On the 
other hand, a leveraged farm is expected to have a lower value to the farmers 
(equityholders) and a higher value to the debtholders due to the reduction of risk.  The 
risk-based hypothesis indicates that diversification lowers equityholder value with the 
shareholder loss being an increasing function of farm leverage.  The risk-based 
hypothesis is tested by measuring the value losses for equity and leveraged farms. 
 
Data 
The data for this study were obtained from the 1999, 2000, and 2001 Agricultural 
Resource Management Study (ARMS) conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics   8 
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
8  The ARMS data are very appropriate for 
studying farm diversification because the data include farms with diverse typologies and 
different locations.  Farmers identified commodities produced, commodity sales, leverage 
ratios, and total assets.  Data are obtained for all farms with total assets of at least 
$40,000 and value of total production of at least $10,000.  This screening is done to avoid 
distorted ratios in the calculation of excess values, with similar results when using 
different cut-off points.  Consistent with other finance studies, farms with extreme excess 
values (defined as the actual values being either more than four times the imputed values 
or less than one-fourth of the imputed values) are excluded from the analysis.  These 
elimination procedures result in a sample of 15,030 farm observations for 1999-2001.  
This sample includes 9,088 specialized crop or livestock farms and 5,942 crop/livestock 
diversified farms, and is used in the crop/livestock diversification models.   
Twelve commodities considered in the commodity diversification models include 
wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, tobacco, cotton, fruit, vegetables, nursery, cattle, hogs, and 
poultry.  Other commodities are not considered because the ARMS data include fewer 
than 30 specialized farms producing a specific commodity (such as sorghum) or because 
some commodities are lumped into a diverse aggregate category (such as other grains or 
other livestock).  Farms are included in the commodity diversification models when the 
sum of the value of production for the above 12 commodities is within 1% of the total 
value of farm production.  These additional elimination procedures based on available 
commodity data result in a sample of 8,634 farm observations for 1999-2001.  This 
                                                 
8 Each farm in the ARMS data has been assigned a weight that reflects the number of U.S. farms that this 
farm represents.  All descriptive statistics and regression estimation use these weights (utilizing the delete-
a-group jackknife procedure) to ensure that the results are representative of U.S. farms.  For more 
information on the delete-a-group jackknife procedure see Dubman.   9 
sample includes 3,385 commodity-specialized farms and 5,249 commodity-diversified 
farms and is used in the commodity diversification models.  Finance studies report that 
there are two times more specialized corporate firms than diversified firms (Berger and 
Ofek; Mansi and Reeb). 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for specialized and diversified farms using the 
crop/livestock and commodity diversification criteria.  The median number of commodity 
produced by diversified farms is two, similar to Dodson’s findings.  Crop/livestock 
diversified farms have on average $792,108 in total assets and a debt-to-asset ratio of 
13%, while commodity diversified farms have on average $859,134 in total assets and a 
debt-to-asset ratio of 13.4%.  Both crop/livestock and commodity diversified farms tend 
to have a slightly higher value of total assets and debt-to-asset ratios than specialized 
farms, and a larger proportion of the diversified farms are leveraged.
9  Berger and Ofek 
found that, at the median, corporate multi-segment firms have three segments, roughly 
three times the total capital of single-segment firms ($316 million versus $116 million), 
and slightly higher debt-to-asset ratios (0.29 versus 0.257).  An important difference 
between corporate firms and agricultural farms is that, on average, while diversified 
corporate firms increase assets in proportion to firm segments, diversified farms spread 
the same assets onto more commodities rather than become larger.  Also, on average, the 
debt-to-asset ratios for corporate firms are twice as high as the debt-to-asset ratios for 
farms. 
Table 1 also reports the excess values of specialized and diversified farms 
calculated using equation (3).  The excess values for the specialized farms are positively 
                                                 
9 Similar to Mansi and Reeb, equity farms are defined as those with debt-to-asset ratios less than 1% and 
leveraged farms are defined as those with debt-to-asset ratios of at least 1%.   10 
skewed with medians of 6.7% for specialized crop or livestock farms and 2% for 
specialized commodity farms.  On the other hand, the excess values for the diversified 
farms are negatively skewed with medians of -5.4% for crop/livestock diversified farms 
and -23.8% for commodity diversified farms.  The negative differences in mean and 
median excess values between specialized and diversified farms indicate that 
diversification reduces value.  Berger and Ofek, and Mansi and Reeb found similar 
results for corporate firms. 
 
Regression Results 
The relationship between value loss and diversification is further explored by regressing 
the excess values on various control variables and a diversification dummy variable 
which equals one if the farm is diversified.  The coefficient on the diversification dummy 
variable captures the percentage difference in average excess values between specialized 
and diversified farms.  Table 2 shows that the coefficients on the diversification dummy 
variable are negative and significant, showing a value loss from diversification ranging 
from 5.8% in the crop/livestock diversification model to 9.4% in the commodity 
diversification model.  In other words, crop/livestock diversified farms have a 5.8% 
discount in value when compared with similar crop or livestock specialized farms and 
commodity diversified farms have a 9.4% discount in value when compared with similar 
commodity specialized farms.  A similar diversification discount is found for corporate 
firms: Berger and Ofek found that diversified corporate firms trade at a 13-15% discount 
using Compustat Industry Segment data for 1986-1991 and Mansi and Reed found a 
4.5% discount using Disclosure WorldScope data for 1988-1999.     11 
Since these losses are based on the value of assets which represents total capital, 
the value loss to farmers (who are the equity holders) is even larger than these discount 
measures suggest.  Assuming no effect on debt value, the value loss to equity is 
calculated as the diversification discount times the average asset-to-equity ratio for 
diversified farms (Berger and Ofek).  Using the average debt-to-asset ratio of 13% for 
diversified farms, the value loss to equity is 6.7% using the crop/livestock diversification 
model and 10.8% using the commodity diversification model.  
The regressions also include control variables that could affect excess values and 
whose effects are not determined by whether the farm is diversified.  Government 
payments are included as a control variable because they are often considered a risk-
reducing mechanism (Mishra and El-Osta).  Receiving government payments has a 
significantly negative but relatively small impact on farm excess values.  Government 
payments in the amount of $10,000 are associated with a 0.03% decrease in farm value.  
These results may indicate that government payments may be invested inefficiently in 
poorly performing enterprises. 
Household size is included as a control variable because the need to create 
employment for family members can be associated with increased diversification (Mishra 
and El-Osta).  The results from this study suggest that household size has a negative and 
significant impact on farm values when crop/livestock diversification is considered.  
Similarly, off-farm employment as an alternative risk management strategy can reduce 
the need for diversification.  The results show that total off-farm income has a positive 
and significant effect on farm excess values.  Therefore, additional household members 
are associated with a farm diversification discount unless they are employed off the farm.    12 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification causes resources to 
flow to inefficient investments (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales; Lamont; Whited).  The 
results also indicate that for older farmers, diversification is associated with an increase in 
farm value.  More educated farmers also earn a farm diversification premium when they 
diversify across crops and livestock.  For older or more educated farmers, diversification 
may also be implemented as a value-enhancement rather than a risk-reduction strategy.   
The positive and significant coefficient on total assets indicates that larger farms 
are associated with an increase in farm value due to diversification or alternatively that 
the greatest value loss occurs in small farms.  For corporate firms, Berger and Ofek, and 
Campa and Kedia report similar results and Mansi and Reeb report opposite results.  The 
evidence for the effect of farm size on diversification activities is also mixed.  Pope and 
Prescott find that larger farms are more diversified and Mishra and El-Osta find that 
larger farms are more specialized.  Our results are consistent with the economies of scale 
hypothesis. 
The analysis presented in table 2 is extended by estimating the excess value 
models for crop farms and livestock farms separately.  Commodity diversified farms are 
further divided into crop farms producing more than one crop and livestock farms 
producing more than one type of livestock.  The results in table 3 show that commodity 
diversification for crop farms is associated with a reduction in farm value of 12.6%, 
whereas commodity diversification for livestock farms is not associated with a value loss.   
To test the robustness of the results, an alternative measure of diversification is 
used as suggested in Berger and Ofek.  The third model in table 3 estimates the 
relationship between the value loss of diversified farms and the number of commodities   13 
they produce.
10  The results show that the diversification discount increases as the 
number of commodities increase, with a value loss of 7.4% for each additional 
commodity produced.  Therefore, producing more commodities leads to a reduction in 
farm value. 
The results in table 2 indicated that leverage has a negative and significant effect 
on farm excess values, in other words, more leveraged farms have larger value losses due 
to diversification.  Consistent with the risk-reduction hypothesis, more leveraged farms 
may need to diversify in order to make debt payments with greater certainty.  To further 
explain the interaction between leverage and diversification, the sample is divided into 
equity farms (with debt-to-asset ratios of less than 1%) and leveraged farms.  Table 4 
shows the crop/livestock and commodity diversification models for equity and leveraged 
farms.  The risk-based hypothesis suggests that the diversification discount should be 
insignificant for the sample of equity farms.  Consistent with the risk-based hypothesis, 
the coefficient on the diversification dummy variable is insignificant for all equity farms.  
These results indicate that there is no evidence of a diversification discount for all equity 
farms.  On the other hand, leveraged farms have a value loss of 8.4% if they are 
crop/livestock diversified and a value loss of 14.9% if they are commodity diversified.  
Mansi and Reeb find similar results for equity and leveraged corporate firms. 
Although commodities grown in the U.S. are very diverse, weather and soil 
conditions within a region are usually suitable for growing only a few crop and livestock 
commodities.  Therefore, the region is implicitly taken into account when specialized and 
diversified farms are matched based on the same commodities.  
 
                                                 
10 This approach is not applicable for the crop/livestock diversification model.   14 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study applied the Berger and Ofek methods to consider the effect of diversification 
on farm value by estimating the value of diversified farm enterprises as if they were 
operated as separate specialized farms.  The results show that farms have a diversification 
discount similar to corporate firms.  In comparison to specialized farms, crop/livestock 
diversified farms have a value loss of 5.8% and commodity diversified farms have a 
value loss of 9.4% for 1999-2001.  Commodity diversification for crop farms is 
associated with a 12.6% diversification discount, however, commodity diversification for 
livestock farms does not lead to a loss in farm value.  These value losses are increasing 
with leverage, consistent with the risk-reducing effects of diversification.  Leveraged 
farms have a value loss of 8.4% to 14.9% due to diversification.   
  Consistent with the findings that diversified corporate firms trade at a discount, 
firm diversification has decreased in the corporate world (Comment and Jarrell).  
Individual investors may not be willing to accept lower values for the lower risk 
associated with diversified firms because these investors can diversify their portfolios of 
specialized companies through mutual funds and thus reduce risk themselves.  In 
agriculture, however, farms are not traded and farmers usually do not hold diversified 
portfolios of assets.  Therefore, the trend toward more diversification in agriculture is not 
surprising.  Nevertheless, this study documents a diversification discount in agriculture 
that is similar to the diversification discount found in the corporate world.  As residual 
risk-bearers, farmers may have to accept lower farm values for the risk-reduction 
associated with diversification.    15 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Specialized and Diversified Farms 
  Crop/Livestock 
Diversification 
Commodity Diversification 
Variables  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Mean  Median  St. Dev. 
Number of Enterprises 
   Specialized Farms 



















Total Assets (in dollars) 
   Specialized Farms 



















Value of Production (in 
dollars) 
  Specialized Farms 






















   Specialized Farms 



















Proportion of Leveraged 
Farms 
   Specialized Farms 


























   Specialized Farms 



















Number of Farms 
   Specialized Farms 




    8,634 
3,385 
5,249 
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Table 2.  Regressions of Excess Value on a Diversification Dummy Variable and 
Other Control Variables
a 




Intercept  -0.624 
(-9.74) 

















Total Assets  1.65E-08 
(3.36) 
**  1.71E-08 
(3.46) 
** 
Debt to Asset 
   Ratio 
-0.677 
(-8.29) 




   Payments 
-3.15E-06 
(-6.01) 
**  -2.49E-06 
(-3.74) 
** 
Operator Age  0.013 
(13.79) 




   Education 
0.030 
(2.91) 
**  0.010 
(0.73) 
 
Household Size  -0.013 
(-2.41) 




  Income 
1.02E-06 
(4.18) 




2  0.16    0.13   
Number of Observations  15,030    8,634   
aThe dependent variable is farm excess value calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of a actual farm value to imputed farm value.  
b The crop/livestock diversification dummy variable equals 1 if a farm produces both 
crops and livestock, and zero if a farm produces only crops or livestock. 
c The commodity diversification dummy variable equals 1 if a farm produces two or more 
commodities, and 0 if a farm produces only one commodity.   20 
Table 3.  Commodity Diversification Models
a 
  Commodity Diversification 
  Crop Farms  Livestock Farms  All Farms 
Intercept  -0.759 
(-4.36) 
**  -0.334 
(-1.56) 













     
Number of 
Commodities 




Total Assets  7.94E-09 
(1.59) 
  2.31E-08 
(0.88) 
  1.72E-08 
(3.53) 
** 
Debt to Asset 
   Ratio 
-0.477 
(-3.63) 
**  -0.666 
(-4.92) 




   Payments 
-1.75E-06 
(-2.56) 
**  2.19E-06 
(0.12) 
  -2.29E-06 
(-3.73) 
** 
Operator Age  0.014 
(6.80) 
**  0.004 
(1.43) 




   Education 
-0.011 
(-0.46) 
  0.021 
(0.87) 
  0.009 
(0.62) 
 
Household Size  0.009 
(0.53) 
  0.029 
(1.66) 




  Income 
9.30E-07 
(3.15) 
**  3.42E-07 
(1.75) 




2  0.15    0.06    0.13   
Number of 
Observations 
3,632    2,537    8,634   
a The dependent variable is farm excess value calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of the farm actual value to the farm imputed value.  
b The commodity diversification variable equals 1 if a farm produces two or more 
commodities, and 0 if a farm produces only one commodity.  21 
Table 4.  The Farm Diversification Discount for Equity and Leveraged Farms
a,b 











Intercept  -0.336 
(-2.78) 
**  -0.949 
(-12.78) 
**  -0.474 
(-2.65) 

























Total Assets  2.04E-08 
(1.89) 
*  1.70E-08 
(3.27) 
**  2.25E-08 
(1.65) 




   Payments 
-4.59E-06 
(-9.84) 
**  -2.74E-06 
(-4.61) 






Operator Age  0.010 
(5.81) 
**  0.014 
(15.82) 
**  0.007 
(3.14) 




   Education 
0.017 
(1.27) 
  0.041 
(3.40) 
**  0.004 
(0.15) 




   Size 
-0.018 
(-1.66) 
*  -0.007 
(-1.01) 
  0.033 
(1.87) 




  Farm Income 
8.16E-07 
(4.07) 
**  1.11E-06 
(2.99) 
**  7.99E-07 
(2.53) 




2  0.07    0.11    0.04    0.09   
Number of 
Observations 
4,546    10,484    2,892    5,742   
aThe dependent variable is excess value calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
a farm actual value to farm imputed value.  
b Equity farms are defined as farms with debt-to-asset ratios less than 1% and leveraged 
farms are defined as farms with debt-to-asset ratios of at least 1%. 